April 10, 1812 : Castlereagh's Instructions

On April 10, 1812, the newly appointed British Foreign Minister Castlereagh wrote or approved instructions to Augustus J. Foster, British Minister in America. The instructions seek again to justify Britain's policy and assert that the Orders in Council would not be repealed until the French decrees were "rescinded, absolutely and unconditionally." Castlereagh's instructions to Foster were only received in Washington on or about June 1, 1812. Days after the instructions become public, Madison sent his message to Congress calling for war with Great Britain. Madison took the instructions as the final diplomatic rebuff from Britain. Foster had also received instructions to offer, as a concession, that Britain would relax or modify the Orders in Council, which required licensing trade with the continent, and in  its place enforce a rigorous blockade. Madison chose not to consider this offer. In addition, when war was declared the British government had already announced that the  Orders in Council would be repealed. Miscommunication, caused by distances that could only be traversed in months, leads to a war whose main cause had ceased to exist when it started. The instructions from Castlereagh to Foster are reproduced below:

CASTLEREAGH TO FOSTER 39 
No. 9. FOKEIGN OFFICE, April 10th: 1812. 

Sir, 

The communication which you are authorized by my dispatch No. 8 

to make to the American Government, cannot fail to prove a touch- 

stone of their policy and intentions. It is impossible they should not 

deeply feel the embarrassments, in which the insidious policy of the 

enemy and their own weakness, have placed them. Under ordinary 

circumstances it might be expected, that the conduct of a Government, 

determined to prove to the World, that they would neither submit 

to be deceived, nor be involved by France in such disgraceful trans- 

actions, would be to resent in the most decided manner, the imposi- 

tion practised upon them; but the internal Politicks of America have 

so much connected the interests of the Party in power with the French 

Alliance, that I cannot encourage much expectation, whatever they 

may in their hearts feel, that they will be induced to assume any 

authoritative Tone against France. 

It is more probable, that the new aspect the question has now as- 

sumed, may awaken them to a Sense of the folly of attempting either 

to force, or intimidate Great Britain; and that, alarmed at the danger 

even to themselves of the former attempt, and the hopelessness of the 

latter, they may with more prudence than has lately marked their 

Councils, see, in this new posture of affairs, an opportunity of receding 

without disgrace from the precipice of War, to which they have been 

so inconsiderately approached. 

To assist their retreat without any unnecessary sacrifice of national 

dignity, is the sincere desire and the best policy of Great Britain: 

To rescue America from the influence of France, is of more im- 

portance, than committing Her in War with that Power; and to 

revive the relations of amity and commerce between Great Britain 

and America, are more to be aimed at (whilst none of our essential 

rights are compromised) than protracted discussions or controversial 

questions of maritime Law. It is on these grounds the desire of 

the Prince Begent, if you should perceive a becoming temper in the 

Councils of America, that it should be met by a marked disposition 

on your part to conciliate. In the close of the former dispatch I was 

commanded by His Koyal Highness to declare, that, whilst He never 

could compromise the maritime Bights of Great Britain, His Boyal 

Highness would be ready at all times to concert with America as to 

their exercise, and so to regulate their application, as to combine 

as far as possible the interests of America with the object of effectually 

retaliating upon France the measure of Her own injustice. 

It is with reference to this principle that I am now directed to 

call your attention to the question of Licences to trade with the block- 

aded Ports, in relaxation of the Orders of April 1809. You will 

not fail to recollect, that the complaints of America have never yet 

been urged very distinctly upon this ground ; The Government of The 

United States having been in the habit of standing upon higher 

grounds of objection : but it nevertheless has been occasionally urged 

by them, that although these Licenses have been uniformly granted 

to neutral as well as to British Trade, the neutral Merchant cannot 

profit by such relaxation, (especially the American Merchant from 

his remote situation) in the same degree as the British Merchant can, 

regulating his transactions on the Spot where the Licenses are issued. 

The extent to which this intercourse under Licenses has been car- 

ried, and the disposition evinced on the part of the French Govern- 

ment to give greater extension to it, will probably attract the notice 

of the American Government, and lead them to instance the magni- 

tude of this particular trade, as an additional proof of the alledged 

injustice of Our System; but, if it should not occasion any formal 

representation on their part, there can be no objection to your revert- 

ing to it as a circumstance strongly indicative, that, whatever the 

Duke of Bassano may think fit to assert, of the efficacy of the French 

Decrees against British Commerce, and however France may be de- 

sirous to cloak Her present projects in the North of Europe, under 

the pretext of enforcing by Her arms the Continental System, She 

is Herself at this moment obliged to yield at home, in breach of 

Her own System, to the pressure of our retaliating measures, a very 

extensive direct trade with this Country. 

In adverting to this subject, you will observe that if, instead of 

impeaching the fundamental principles of our Retaliatory Rights, the 

Government of America had represented against the partial effects 

of any particular relaxation of those Eights which We had adopted, 

the British Government would not have been indisposed to listen to 

such representations. It would have been ready on the contrary to 

have sustained much of national inconvenience, to remove such 

grounds of complaint, provided there had been reason at the same 

time to believe, that such a Concession on It's part, would have led 

to a return of amity and Commercial intercourse between the two 

States. 

You may represent to the American Government, that the Order 

of April 1809, was in a great measure intended to meet the wishes 

of America, as well as to consult the interest of Our Allies, by the 

removal of certain inconveniences, to which they were subjected, but 

which were not considered essential to the efficacy of our Retaliatory 

System. 

If America at the time had expressed any satisfaction with that 

modification of our Orders in Council, which, whilst it confined 

their Sphere of action within narrower limits, applied the principle 

of the blockade itself within those limits, without any modification or 

exception; the British Government would not have broken in upon 

the strict rule of that order by Licenses: But when We found it 

received by America, in as hostile a Spirit, as the original Orders in 

Council, there remained no reason, as far as the question of concilia- 

tion was concerned, why We should not accompany that Order with 

some of the same regulations, relative to trade to and from the block- 

aded Coast, and the Ports of Great Britain (not only for ourselves 

but for neutrals) by means of Licenses, as were, without any Licenses, 

introduced into the original Orders, and formed a material part of 

the system on which they proceeded. 

It has been urged against these partial relaxations of the blockade, 

that they tend to prevent or retard the attainment of it's alledged 

object, namely, the abandonment of the hostile decrees on the part 

of the enemy, in which Neutral Powers, who suffer from the effects 

of the blockade, have an interest as large as our own. 

The objection would be just, if urged by a neutral who had 

acquiesced in the blockade, consented to await it's effect, and done 

nothing to obstruct it's operation. But the United States on the con- 

trary have opposed our exercise of this retaliatory right, and per- 

mitted, not to say, encouraged, the breach of the blockade, by the 

American Merchants. The consequence has been, that very con- 

siderable numbers of American Ships have been able, either by avoid- 

ing the notice of our Cruizers, or by the mask of a false destination, 

to enter the Ports of blockaded Countries, and to sail from thence ; 

thus relieving the necessities of the enemy, and delivering him in 

no small, degree from the pressure of our retaliatory measures. They 

have also cooperated with France, by prohibiting, in concurrence 

with Her, the importation of British produce and manufactures into 

the Ports of America. 

Under such circumstances, America cannot fairly object to our 

accepting from the enemy such partial and progressive practical 

retractions of  his own rigorous system, as his necessities, arising 

out of the pressure of these very measures, may constrain him to 

yield, nor to our enabling Our Merchants by Licenses to avail them- 

selves of those reluctant concessions, without being exposed to cap- 

ture, by Ships of War of their own Country, for engaging in a 

prohibited trade. 

To relieve our commerce and manufacture from the oppressive 

effects of the hostile decrees, by imposing upon the enemy such a 

measure of distress, as might oblige him to recall them, was the main 

object of our retaliatory system. To reject the exceptions, there- 

fore, which He is driven to admit, would be in some degree to sacri- 

fice the end for the sake of the means. The only adequate motives 

for such a Sacrifice, would be either, that, by refusing the exception, 

and maintaining the blockade with undeviating strictness, the gen- 

eral end might be sooner and more entirely attained; or that our 

retaliatory System might by such strictness be reconciled more easily 

to the views of neutral Powers. But both these motives have been 

hitherto precluded by the conduct of the United States. While 

they are found irreconcileably adverse to the rule itself, it matters 

not, in a view to harmony with them, whether the rule itself be more 

strictly or loosely applied; nor can it be material to the ultimate 

effect on the enemy, whether exceptions to the rule by British Li- 

censes, or Contraventions of it by American Merchants, with the 

approbation of their own Government, alleviate the enemy's distress. 

At least America has no right to exact from Us an abstinence from 

the one, while She refuses to desist from the other. 

If, however, the views of the American Government are altered 

on this subject; and if, without raising any further question on the 

principles in dispute, they are disposed to open the intercourse with 

Us, upon condition, that We shall again resort to the principle of 

rigorous blockade against the French Dominions, to the exclusion of 

our trade equally with that of neutral Nations, an arrangement upon 

such a basis you are hereby authorized to concludfe; In which ar- 

rangement you may undertake, that, upon an assurance being received 

through you, that the Government of America had actually deter- 

mined to re: open Her intercourse with Great Britain, from a period 

to be named, when it might be presumed, that such a notification 

had been received here; no fresh Licenses in defeasance of such 

blockade will be issued by this Government. 

You will understand, that these Acts must be made contemporane- 

ous as far as possible in their effects, as the British Government 

could not stand justified to it's own Merchants and manufacturers, 

were they to relinquish the trade to France, at a moment when it 

promises to become so considerable, and affords so decisive a proof 

of the efficacy of our Orders in Council: unless the immediate re- 

opening of the markets of America should afford some sufficient 

compensation for the loss of that Trade. 

If you are right in supposing, that the American Government 

only wants some new Step on the part of this Government, on which 

to found a change of policy; and if the new and extravagant pre- 

tensions of the French Government should strangely fail to furnish 

a satisfactory ground for such conduct; the proposition you are 

hereby authorized to make will afford them the fairest Opportunity. 

If it fails of success, it will at least have served, as a test of the 

principles on which America stands. It will remove the whole argu- 

ment of grievance on our part, so far as it rests upon the collateral 

ground of the relaxations our Orders in Council have undergone, 

and bring the question at once back to the broad principles of our 

rights of blockade and retaliation. 

If, however, America persists in requiring Us to abandon Our 

maritime Rights, either as resting on the ordinary Laws of maritime 

blockade, or the particular right We now insist on of retaliating 

upon the Enemy, as claimed under the Orders in Council, You will 

not express yourself in such a manner as to encourage the most dis- 

tant hope of our being induced to make such a sacrifice. 

If, on the other hand, She complains only of the mode in which 

these rights are exercised, in the intercourse permitted under Li- 

censes with the blockaded Ports, the British Government is ready, 

either to concert with America as to the mode in which they shall 

be hereafter exercised upon principles of mutual Convenience; or 

it is ready, as above proposed, to wave all relaxations whatever, and 

to stand in future on the rigorous execution of the blockade. 

Should, however, America refuse either of these Alternatives; 

and, notwithstanding the evidence She has lately obtained of the 

real designs of France, continue to exclude British Commerce and 

British Ships of War from Her Ports, whilst they are open to those 

of the enemy, it is then clear, that we are at Issue with America 

upon principles, which, upon the part of this Government, You are 

not at liberty to compromise. 

CASTLEREAGH TO FOSTER 

No. 10. Private. FOREIGN OFFICE, April 10 : 1812. 

Sir, 

In the management of the Negociation, with which you are en- 

trusted, you will continue to conduct yourself with the utmost concili- 

ation towards America; You will firmly adhere to the, principles, on 

which this Government considers itself bound to act, but you are to 

avoid pressing them upon America, in such a manner as might expose 

the Negociation to an abrupt termination. Whilst no injurious con- 

cession is made to the United States, nor any necessary exertion against 

the Enemy relaxed, it is not essential to the interest of Great Britain, 

that America should be urged to an immediate decision. In proportion 

as a Rupture can be delayed, the insidious designs of France must be- 

come apparent ; the chances of Peace being preserved with America be 

improved, and it will become more and more difficult for the Amer- 

ican Government to embark that Country in a War with Great Britain. 

Should the Councils of America reject every pacific suggestion, it will 

be your object, to regulate the discussion in such a manner, as 

to throw distinctly upon the United States the option of War: Much 

must depend hereafter on the impression made in this respect on the 

feelings, and understandings, of the American People. 

Your forbearance must not however lead you to withdraw from the 

temperate discussion and refutation of the pretences, upon which the 

American Government will attempt to justify their conduct ; and I am 

particularly to recommend to you, whenever the Arguments, against 

which you have to contend, may lead you for a time from the main 

points in dispute, that you do upon all occasions endeavour to bring 

back the discussions to the broad features of the Case ; and never allow 

the American Government to escape from the Position, that if they 

are determined upon War, it is a War undertaken to compel Great 

Britain to submit to France, her inveterate Enemy, her Maritime 

Rights and Power: That the demand upon Great Britain from the 

outset, has been to surrender her Eights, of ordinary Blockade, to 

France, and her Eights of Retaliation, to America; and that she is 

now called upon for the additional sacrifice to France, of every re- 

maining principle, upon which her safety or greatness as a Mar- 

itime Power depends. You must never suffer it to be lost sight of, 

that the Blockade of 1806 is the true hinge, upon which the whole 

Contest turns : whatever may have been supposed to be the State of the 

Question before, it is now plain from the manner in which France 

brings forward her pretensions, that the abandonment of the prin- 

ciples, on which that Measure was founded; vizt. the established 

principles of Maritime Blockade, as distinguished from those now pro- 

mulgated by France, has been throughout the invariable and indis- 

pensable condition, on the part of France, of the Repeal of the Berlin 

and Milan Decrees. Unless Great Britain was prepared to relin- 

quish these principles, She might surrender her System of Retaliation 

to America, but she could not deliver herself thereby from the inter- 

dict of France. 

It is not therefore merely a Contest with respect to the Orders in 

Council. It is a contest for the most ancient, undoubted and essen- 

tial maxims of Maritime Law; and America must never be allowed 

to state, that Great Britain has had any option of complying with her 

demands, but at the Expense of surrendering her most vital and 

essential Rights to France, and standing helpless and disarmed in 

the presence of her adversary. 

To what purpose begin by rescinding the Orders in Council, in 

order to conciliate America, when it has been avowed that the Decrees 

of France, would continue in force, not only against Great Britain, 

but against America herself, if America acted in contravention of 

her new Code? Why should America if she means to resist, and not to 

submit to France, wish us to retract them? Can she in the former 

case find so cheap and so effective an Instrument of coercion against . 

that Power? 

You may put the whole upon this issue: Will America join France 

in an attempt to impose a System upon the World, which, under the 

mask of Municipal Regulations, aided by the overwhelming principles 

of incorporating or invading all States, reluctant, or disobedient to 

her Will, is to give to that Nation absolute Dominion over the Land, 

whilst the Cover of a Neutral Flag is to render her Power as un- 

assailable by Sea ? 

Great Britain, you may declare, has other views and duties to per- 

form, and from the performance of those duties she cannot shrink. 

The Instructions you now receive will enable you to represent, 

that nothing has been omitted to conciliate America. Every minor 

Question has been conceded; and nothing remains but fundamental 

Rights, which can admit of no compromise. The decision therefore 

rests with America, and it is to be hoped her determination will be 

founded on a fair review of the Claims and Interests of both States.