On April 10, 1812, the newly appointed British Foreign Minister Castlereagh wrote or approved instructions to Augustus J. Foster, British Minister in America. The instructions seek again to justify Britain's policy and assert that the Orders in Council would not be repealed until the French decrees were "rescinded, absolutely and unconditionally." Castlereagh's instructions to Foster were only received in Washington on or about June 1, 1812. Days after the instructions become public, Madison sent his message to Congress calling for war with Great Britain. Madison took the instructions as the final diplomatic rebuff from Britain. Foster had also received instructions to offer, as a concession, that Britain would relax or modify the Orders in Council, which required licensing trade with the continent, and in its place enforce a rigorous blockade. Madison chose not to consider this offer. In addition, when war was declared the British government had already announced that the Orders in Council would be repealed. Miscommunication, caused by distances that could only be traversed in months, leads to a war whose main cause had ceased to exist when it started. The instructions from Castlereagh to Foster are reproduced below:
CASTLEREAGH TO FOSTER 39
No. 9. FOKEIGN OFFICE, April 10th: 1812.
Sir,
The communication which you are authorized by my dispatch No. 8
to make to the American Government, cannot fail to prove a touch-
stone of their policy and intentions. It is impossible they should not
deeply feel the embarrassments, in which the insidious policy of the
enemy and their own weakness, have placed them. Under ordinary
circumstances it might be expected, that the conduct of a Government,
determined to prove to the World, that they would neither submit
to be deceived, nor be involved by France in such disgraceful trans-
actions, would be to resent in the most decided manner, the imposi-
tion practised upon them; but the internal Politicks of America have
so much connected the interests of the Party in power with the French
Alliance, that I cannot encourage much expectation, whatever they
may in their hearts feel, that they will be induced to assume any
authoritative Tone against France.
It is more probable, that the new aspect the question has now as-
sumed, may awaken them to a Sense of the folly of attempting either
to force, or intimidate Great Britain; and that, alarmed at the danger
even to themselves of the former attempt, and the hopelessness of the
latter, they may with more prudence than has lately marked their
Councils, see, in this new posture of affairs, an opportunity of receding
without disgrace from the precipice of War, to which they have been
so inconsiderately approached.
To assist their retreat without any unnecessary sacrifice of national
dignity, is the sincere desire and the best policy of Great Britain:
To rescue America from the influence of France, is of more im-
portance, than committing Her in War with that Power; and to
revive the relations of amity and commerce between Great Britain
and America, are more to be aimed at (whilst none of our essential
rights are compromised) than protracted discussions or controversial
questions of maritime Law. It is on these grounds the desire of
the Prince Begent, if you should perceive a becoming temper in the
Councils of America, that it should be met by a marked disposition
on your part to conciliate. In the close of the former dispatch I was
commanded by His Koyal Highness to declare, that, whilst He never
could compromise the maritime Bights of Great Britain, His Boyal
Highness would be ready at all times to concert with America as to
their exercise, and so to regulate their application, as to combine
as far as possible the interests of America with the object of effectually
retaliating upon France the measure of Her own injustice.
It is with reference to this principle that I am now directed to
call your attention to the question of Licences to trade with the block-
aded Ports, in relaxation of the Orders of April 1809. You will
not fail to recollect, that the complaints of America have never yet
been urged very distinctly upon this ground ; The Government of The
United States having been in the habit of standing upon higher
grounds of objection : but it nevertheless has been occasionally urged
by them, that although these Licenses have been uniformly granted
to neutral as well as to British Trade, the neutral Merchant cannot
profit by such relaxation, (especially the American Merchant from
his remote situation) in the same degree as the British Merchant can,
regulating his transactions on the Spot where the Licenses are issued.
The extent to which this intercourse under Licenses has been car-
ried, and the disposition evinced on the part of the French Govern-
ment to give greater extension to it, will probably attract the notice
of the American Government, and lead them to instance the magni-
tude of this particular trade, as an additional proof of the alledged
injustice of Our System; but, if it should not occasion any formal
representation on their part, there can be no objection to your revert-
ing to it as a circumstance strongly indicative, that, whatever the
Duke of Bassano may think fit to assert, of the efficacy of the French
Decrees against British Commerce, and however France may be de-
sirous to cloak Her present projects in the North of Europe, under
the pretext of enforcing by Her arms the Continental System, She
is Herself at this moment obliged to yield at home, in breach of
Her own System, to the pressure of our retaliating measures, a very
extensive direct trade with this Country.
In adverting to this subject, you will observe that if, instead of
impeaching the fundamental principles of our Retaliatory Rights, the
Government of America had represented against the partial effects
of any particular relaxation of those Eights which We had adopted,
the British Government would not have been indisposed to listen to
such representations. It would have been ready on the contrary to
have sustained much of national inconvenience, to remove such
grounds of complaint, provided there had been reason at the same
time to believe, that such a Concession on It's part, would have led
to a return of amity and Commercial intercourse between the two
States.
You may represent to the American Government, that the Order
of April 1809, was in a great measure intended to meet the wishes
of America, as well as to consult the interest of Our Allies, by the
removal of certain inconveniences, to which they were subjected, but
which were not considered essential to the efficacy of our Retaliatory
System.
If America at the time had expressed any satisfaction with that
modification of our Orders in Council, which, whilst it confined
their Sphere of action within narrower limits, applied the principle
of the blockade itself within those limits, without any modification or
exception; the British Government would not have broken in upon
the strict rule of that order by Licenses: But when We found it
received by America, in as hostile a Spirit, as the original Orders in
Council, there remained no reason, as far as the question of concilia-
tion was concerned, why We should not accompany that Order with
some of the same regulations, relative to trade to and from the block-
aded Coast, and the Ports of Great Britain (not only for ourselves
but for neutrals) by means of Licenses, as were, without any Licenses,
introduced into the original Orders, and formed a material part of
the system on which they proceeded.
It has been urged against these partial relaxations of the blockade,
that they tend to prevent or retard the attainment of it's alledged
object, namely, the abandonment of the hostile decrees on the part
of the enemy, in which Neutral Powers, who suffer from the effects
of the blockade, have an interest as large as our own.
The objection would be just, if urged by a neutral who had
acquiesced in the blockade, consented to await it's effect, and done
nothing to obstruct it's operation. But the United States on the con-
trary have opposed our exercise of this retaliatory right, and per-
mitted, not to say, encouraged, the breach of the blockade, by the
American Merchants. The consequence has been, that very con-
siderable numbers of American Ships have been able, either by avoid-
ing the notice of our Cruizers, or by the mask of a false destination,
to enter the Ports of blockaded Countries, and to sail from thence ;
thus relieving the necessities of the enemy, and delivering him in
no small, degree from the pressure of our retaliatory measures. They
have also cooperated with France, by prohibiting, in concurrence
with Her, the importation of British produce and manufactures into
the Ports of America.
Under such circumstances, America cannot fairly object to our
accepting from the enemy such partial and progressive practical
retractions of his own rigorous system, as his necessities, arising
out of the pressure of these very measures, may constrain him to
yield, nor to our enabling Our Merchants by Licenses to avail them-
selves of those reluctant concessions, without being exposed to cap-
ture, by Ships of War of their own Country, for engaging in a
prohibited trade.
To relieve our commerce and manufacture from the oppressive
effects of the hostile decrees, by imposing upon the enemy such a
measure of distress, as might oblige him to recall them, was the main
object of our retaliatory system. To reject the exceptions, there-
fore, which He is driven to admit, would be in some degree to sacri-
fice the end for the sake of the means. The only adequate motives
for such a Sacrifice, would be either, that, by refusing the exception,
and maintaining the blockade with undeviating strictness, the gen-
eral end might be sooner and more entirely attained; or that our
retaliatory System might by such strictness be reconciled more easily
to the views of neutral Powers. But both these motives have been
hitherto precluded by the conduct of the United States. While
they are found irreconcileably adverse to the rule itself, it matters
not, in a view to harmony with them, whether the rule itself be more
strictly or loosely applied; nor can it be material to the ultimate
effect on the enemy, whether exceptions to the rule by British Li-
censes, or Contraventions of it by American Merchants, with the
approbation of their own Government, alleviate the enemy's distress.
At least America has no right to exact from Us an abstinence from
the one, while She refuses to desist from the other.
If, however, the views of the American Government are altered
on this subject; and if, without raising any further question on the
principles in dispute, they are disposed to open the intercourse with
Us, upon condition, that We shall again resort to the principle of
rigorous blockade against the French Dominions, to the exclusion of
our trade equally with that of neutral Nations, an arrangement upon
such a basis you are hereby authorized to concludfe; In which ar-
rangement you may undertake, that, upon an assurance being received
through you, that the Government of America had actually deter-
mined to re: open Her intercourse with Great Britain, from a period
to be named, when it might be presumed, that such a notification
had been received here; no fresh Licenses in defeasance of such
blockade will be issued by this Government.
You will understand, that these Acts must be made contemporane-
ous as far as possible in their effects, as the British Government
could not stand justified to it's own Merchants and manufacturers,
were they to relinquish the trade to France, at a moment when it
promises to become so considerable, and affords so decisive a proof
of the efficacy of our Orders in Council: unless the immediate re-
opening of the markets of America should afford some sufficient
compensation for the loss of that Trade.
If you are right in supposing, that the American Government
only wants some new Step on the part of this Government, on which
to found a change of policy; and if the new and extravagant pre-
tensions of the French Government should strangely fail to furnish
a satisfactory ground for such conduct; the proposition you are
hereby authorized to make will afford them the fairest Opportunity.
If it fails of success, it will at least have served, as a test of the
principles on which America stands. It will remove the whole argu-
ment of grievance on our part, so far as it rests upon the collateral
ground of the relaxations our Orders in Council have undergone,
and bring the question at once back to the broad principles of our
rights of blockade and retaliation.
If, however, America persists in requiring Us to abandon Our
maritime Rights, either as resting on the ordinary Laws of maritime
blockade, or the particular right We now insist on of retaliating
upon the Enemy, as claimed under the Orders in Council, You will
not express yourself in such a manner as to encourage the most dis-
tant hope of our being induced to make such a sacrifice.
If, on the other hand, She complains only of the mode in which
these rights are exercised, in the intercourse permitted under Li-
censes with the blockaded Ports, the British Government is ready,
either to concert with America as to the mode in which they shall
be hereafter exercised upon principles of mutual Convenience; or
it is ready, as above proposed, to wave all relaxations whatever, and
to stand in future on the rigorous execution of the blockade.
Should, however, America refuse either of these Alternatives;
and, notwithstanding the evidence She has lately obtained of the
real designs of France, continue to exclude British Commerce and
British Ships of War from Her Ports, whilst they are open to those
of the enemy, it is then clear, that we are at Issue with America
upon principles, which, upon the part of this Government, You are
not at liberty to compromise.
CASTLEREAGH TO FOSTER
No. 10. Private. FOREIGN OFFICE, April 10 : 1812.
Sir,
In the management of the Negociation, with which you are en-
trusted, you will continue to conduct yourself with the utmost concili-
ation towards America; You will firmly adhere to the, principles, on
which this Government considers itself bound to act, but you are to
avoid pressing them upon America, in such a manner as might expose
the Negociation to an abrupt termination. Whilst no injurious con-
cession is made to the United States, nor any necessary exertion against
the Enemy relaxed, it is not essential to the interest of Great Britain,
that America should be urged to an immediate decision. In proportion
as a Rupture can be delayed, the insidious designs of France must be-
come apparent ; the chances of Peace being preserved with America be
improved, and it will become more and more difficult for the Amer-
ican Government to embark that Country in a War with Great Britain.
Should the Councils of America reject every pacific suggestion, it will
be your object, to regulate the discussion in such a manner, as
to throw distinctly upon the United States the option of War: Much
must depend hereafter on the impression made in this respect on the
feelings, and understandings, of the American People.
Your forbearance must not however lead you to withdraw from the
temperate discussion and refutation of the pretences, upon which the
American Government will attempt to justify their conduct ; and I am
particularly to recommend to you, whenever the Arguments, against
which you have to contend, may lead you for a time from the main
points in dispute, that you do upon all occasions endeavour to bring
back the discussions to the broad features of the Case ; and never allow
the American Government to escape from the Position, that if they
are determined upon War, it is a War undertaken to compel Great
Britain to submit to France, her inveterate Enemy, her Maritime
Rights and Power: That the demand upon Great Britain from the
outset, has been to surrender her Eights, of ordinary Blockade, to
France, and her Eights of Retaliation, to America; and that she is
now called upon for the additional sacrifice to France, of every re-
maining principle, upon which her safety or greatness as a Mar-
itime Power depends. You must never suffer it to be lost sight of,
that the Blockade of 1806 is the true hinge, upon which the whole
Contest turns : whatever may have been supposed to be the State of the
Question before, it is now plain from the manner in which France
brings forward her pretensions, that the abandonment of the prin-
ciples, on which that Measure was founded; vizt. the established
principles of Maritime Blockade, as distinguished from those now pro-
mulgated by France, has been throughout the invariable and indis-
pensable condition, on the part of France, of the Repeal of the Berlin
and Milan Decrees. Unless Great Britain was prepared to relin-
quish these principles, She might surrender her System of Retaliation
to America, but she could not deliver herself thereby from the inter-
dict of France.
It is not therefore merely a Contest with respect to the Orders in
Council. It is a contest for the most ancient, undoubted and essen-
tial maxims of Maritime Law; and America must never be allowed
to state, that Great Britain has had any option of complying with her
demands, but at the Expense of surrendering her most vital and
essential Rights to France, and standing helpless and disarmed in
the presence of her adversary.
To what purpose begin by rescinding the Orders in Council, in
order to conciliate America, when it has been avowed that the Decrees
of France, would continue in force, not only against Great Britain,
but against America herself, if America acted in contravention of
her new Code? Why should America if she means to resist, and not to
submit to France, wish us to retract them? Can she in the former
case find so cheap and so effective an Instrument of coercion against .
that Power?
You may put the whole upon this issue: Will America join France
in an attempt to impose a System upon the World, which, under the
mask of Municipal Regulations, aided by the overwhelming principles
of incorporating or invading all States, reluctant, or disobedient to
her Will, is to give to that Nation absolute Dominion over the Land,
whilst the Cover of a Neutral Flag is to render her Power as un-
assailable by Sea ?
Great Britain, you may declare, has other views and duties to per-
form, and from the performance of those duties she cannot shrink.
The Instructions you now receive will enable you to represent,
that nothing has been omitted to conciliate America. Every minor
Question has been conceded; and nothing remains but fundamental
Rights, which can admit of no compromise. The decision therefore
rests with America, and it is to be hoped her determination will be
founded on a fair review of the Claims and Interests of both States.
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